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JUDICIAL SELECTION AS ... TALK RADIO
Michael J. Gerhardt *
This Symposium allows me the opportunity to reconsider the
analogy that best fits judicial selection. In a series of essays, I
previously considered analogizing judicial selection to war.' This
was an especially apt analogy because confirmation contests often
resemble military conflicts in their deployment of guerrilla tactics
and the take-no-prisoners approaches of the contending sides.2 A
major reason for the intensifying combat over judicial selection is
that we are in the midst of the second longest period in our his-
tory without a vacancy arising on the Supreme Court.3 National
political leaders are terribly anxious over who will get to make
the next appointment to the Court and thus perhaps be able to
determine, for some time to come, how the Court will decide the
many divisive questions of constitutional law that it and it alone
is empowered to decide.4 It is no accident that President Reagan's
and President George H.W. Bush's appointees continue to domi-
* Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe
School of Law; Visiting Fellow, James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institu-
tions, Princeton University, Spring 2004. B.A., 1978, Yale University; M.Sc., 1979, London
School of Economics; J.D., 1982, University of Chicago Law School.
1. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Supreme Court Selection as War (pt. 1), 50 DRAKE L.
REV. 393 (2002); Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War (pt. 2), 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 667 (2003) [hereinafter Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War]; Michael J. Gerhardt,
Judicial Selection as War, Part Three: The Role of Ideology (pt. 3), 15 REGENT U. L. REV.
15 (2002).
2. See, e.g., Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, supra note 1, at 674-79 (describing
the judicial appointment tactics of several "warrior presidents").
3. See, e.g., Charles Lane & Amy Goldstein, At High Court, a Retirement Watch;
Rehnquist, O'Connor Top List of Possibilities as Speculation on Replacement Grows, WASH.
POST, June 17, 2001, at A4 (stating that the last time the membership in the Supreme
Court changed was the 1994 appointment of Justice Stephen Breyer, "creating the second-
longest period of stability in the court's history and pent-up anxiety about when the next
vacancy will occur"); Charlie Savage, Win May Bring Power to Appoint 4 Justices; Cam-
paigns Urged to Focus on Impact, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7, 2004, at A3 ("The decade since
the confirmation of Justice Stephen Breyer is the second-longest interval without a va-
cancy in American history a period just shy of the 11-year record for Supreme Court stabil-
ity, from 1812 to 1823.").
4. See generally Savage, supra note 3, at A3.
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nate the Rehnquist Court, and this circumstance is not lost on
President George W. Bush, the Democrats, and their supporters.5
More recently, I have considered analogizing the federal judi-
cial selection process to a bad dream.6 Confirmation contests have
become frightening in their intensity, and anyone who cares
about the process is bound to lose sleep over the ease with which
negative lessons can be derived from the futility of reforming it. I
have pointed to a number of positive lessons that can be found
within the process if only one dares to look for them.7 The fact
that "conflict[] [is] a choice rather than an inevitability" calls at-
tention to the discretion and political accountability of our lead-
ers.' Knowing that fact might be reassuring, at least for those
who believe that the political checks within the system still work.
To be sure, the responses of our leaders and commentators to
the friction within the process are, for the most part, predictable.
Republicans and Democrats accuse each other of grievous, un-
precedented wrongs within the process.9 Each accuses the other
of triggering a crisis in judicial selection.' ° As someone who has
written a good deal about federal judicial selection, I have won-
dered whether things are really as awful as they sound. As I have
listened to, observed, and participated in the process, I have also
begun to wonder whether what I have heard is the sound in the
halls of our Congress of... Talk Radio. The more I have pondered
the analogy between Talk Radio and judicial selection, the more
sense it makes to me. And the more sense it makes to me, the
5. See James E. DiTullio & John B. Schochet, Note, Saving This Honorable Court: A
Proposal to Replace Life Tenure on the Supreme Court with Staggered, Nonrenewable
Eighteen-Year Terms, 90 VA. L. REV. 1093, 1110-11 (2004); see also Lane & Goldstein, su-
pra note 3, at A4; Savage, supra note 3, at A3; Press Release, John Kerry Campaign, Bush
Plays Politics with Judges Today (July 7, 2004), at http://www.johnkerry.com/pressroom/
releases/pr_2004_0707b.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
6. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Confirmation Dreams, 2004 JURIST [ 2 (Apr. 15, 2004),
at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-jc/gerhardt.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. See Patrick Leahy, Joseph Lieberman, William Rehnquist, Edward Kennedy &
John Cornyn, From the Bag: Irrecusable & Unconfirmable, 7 GREEN BAG 2d 277 (2004)
(containing various pieces of correspondence between these political and judicial figures
concerning judicial selection).
10. See id.; see also John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the
Need for Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181 (2003); Nick Anderson, Battle
over Judiciary Enters New Phase, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2003, at A16; Alison Mitchell, New
Senate Leader Agrees to Hold Votes on 2 Judicial Issues, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2001, at
A20.
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more I have worried about the quality and civility of constitu-
tional dialogue within our national political process. As a teacher
and father, I am particularly troubled about what young people
and the general public might take away from what they hear in
the vicious debates over judicial nominations.
Talk Radio ought to be familiar to just about everyone. It has
become a phenomenon over the past few decades and involves the
broadcasting equivalent of political pamphleteering. Talk Radio
hosts engage in nothing more or less than partisan polemics.
While they purport to be purveying the truth or facts, their spe-
cialty is the broadcast of soft news, or speculation and commen-
tary.1 Republicans largely dominate this forum, just as they
largely dominate the federal political process by virtue of their oc-
cupancy of the presidency and majorities in the House and the
Senate. 2 Below, I hope to illustrate various ways in which the
rhetoric in confirmation contests has begun to resemble Talk Ra-
dio, followed by brief discussions of the possible causes of and
possible remedies for the collapse of the judicial selection process
into Talk Radio.
I.
The hallmarks of Talk Radio are not difficult to identify. They
include a regrettable decline in the quality (and civility) of public
discourse, demonizing the other side, paranoia (in dividing the
world into "us" and "them"), and proliferating unthinking and un-
founded overgeneralizations.
The rhetoric in recent confirmation contests reflects all of these
attributes of Talk Radio. First, and foremost, there has been a
distressing degeneration in the quality of the debate. 3 Each of
the contending sides in confirmation contests must take some re-
sponsibility for this decline. Indeed, each side blames the other
11. BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, WARP SPEED: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF MIXED
MEDIA 59-60 (1999).
12. See Howard Kurtz, Laura Ingraham, Reporting for W2004, WASH. POST, Aug. 30,
2004, at C1. The key word is "largely," for neither party is immune from lapsing into Talk
Radio in the course of disagreements over judicial nominations.
13. See, e.g., John Cornyn, Restoring Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process, 8
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 3-4 (2003).
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for the decline and for intellectual dishonesty and hypocrisy.1 4
You need not listen to much Talk Radio in order to know that it is
filled with a good deal of intellectual dishonesty and hypocrisy,
but we expect more, or ought to expect more, from our political
leaders. Even so, three examples illustrate the poor quality of
constitutional argumentation in confirmation skirmishes. The
first is the switch in the major parties' positions on the constitu-
tionality of the filibuster, by which I mean endless debate permit-
ted by the Senate rules and intended to protract and sometimes
to preclude floor votes.15 Republicans have been absolutely irate
over the Democrats' filibusters of ten of President Bush's judicial
nominations.' 6 In response to the filibusters, the Senate Majority
Leader Bill Frist and some other Republican senators have pro-
posed dismantling the filibuster, and propose adopting the De-
mocrats' own initiatives during the 1990s to reform the filibus-
ter.'7 Democrats are quick to point out that nothing came from
their proposals because the Republican leadership rejected them
all and stood steadfastly by the filibuster.'" Neither side can es-
cape the appearance of hypocrisy on this issue, while both sides in
recent debates over the filibuster relish citing supporting state-
ments for their positions from the other. 9
A second example of the poor quality of argumentation is the
Republicans' insistence that the filibusters against President
Bush's nominees are "unprecedented."20 This is only true if you
14. Compare Press Release, Office of Senator Patrick Leahy, Setting the Record
Straight on Judicial Nominations in North Carolina and Across the Country (July 7,
2004), at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200407/070704a.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2005),
with Cornyn, supra note 13, at 2.
15. See Cornyn, supra note 13, at 3.
16. See, e.g., Nick Anderson & Richard Simon, Debate Marathon Over Judges Ends,
but the Battle Goes On, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2003, at A12; Helen Dewar, Senate Democrats
Block 3 More Bush Judicial Nominees, WASH. POST, July 23, 2004, at A5; Helen Dewar,
Senate Partisanship Worst in Memory, Key Legislation Languishes as Democrats and Re-
publicans Jockey for Power, WASH. POST, May 2, 2004, at A5; Helen Dewar, Senate Fili-
buster Ends with Talk of Next Stage in Fight, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2003, at A9; Neil A.
Lewis, Marathon in the Senate: The Talk is Long, but Temper Short, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2003, at A24; Neil A. Lewis, Angered by Filibusters on Nominees, Republicans Stage Their
Own Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at A29.
17. See S. Res. 138, 108th Cong. (2003); see also 149 CONG. REC. S8843 (daily ed. June
27, 2003) (statement of Sen. Frist).
18. See 149 CONG. REC. S6614-17 (daily ed. May 19, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
19. See, e.g., id. at S6614.
20. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S11,107 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 2003) (statement of Sen. Ses-
sions); 149 CONG. REC. S14,528 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 2003) (statement of Sen. Frist); see also
149 CONG. REC. S14,533 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (describing the
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ignore history.21 Indeed, you need only go back to the prior decade
for proof of the falsehood of this statement. For, in the 1990s, Re-
publican senators, including the current Majority Leader, sup-
ported filibusters of judicial and other nominations. Two of the
filibusters worked-those against the nominations of Sam Brown
as Ambassador and Henry Foster as Surgeon General.23 While all
of the filibusters against judicial nominations ultimately failed to
block floor votes, it is hard to deny-at least with a straight
face-that a filibuster is a filibuster is a filibuster. Its constitu-
tionality does not depend on its success. Even if it did, Republi-
cans cannot deny that a filibuster ended Abe Fortas's nomination
as Chief Justice in 1968.24 At least one Republican witness pro-
posed, without any contradiction from Republican senators, dis-
tinguishing the Fortas filibuster on the ground that it was "bipar-
tisan."25 This argument does not pass what lawyers sometimes
call "the straight face test."26 It makes no sense why the constitu-
tionality of the filibuster depends somehow on the political par-
ties of the senators supporting it. Even if this were the case, the
current filibusters are bipartisan, because Jim Jeffords, an Inde-
pendent, has voted for them.27 It is not clear why a genuinely "bi-
partisan" filibuster must have the support of members of both the
major parties. Nor is it clear why an Independent is not techni-
recent filibuster trend as something that has happened "never [before] in the history of
this country").
21. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S14,687 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Leahy); 149 CONG. REC. S5907 (daily ed. May 8, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 149
CONG. REC. S3337 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
22. See, e.g., 149 C6NG. REC. S5911 (daily ed. May 8, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
23. Id.
24. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 297-98 (3d ed. 1992); see also JOHN ANTHONY
MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 139 (1995); Oona A. Hathaway,
Note, The Politics of the Confirmation Process, 106 YALE L.J. 235, 236 (1996).
25. Judicial Nominations, Filibusters, and the Constitution: When a Majority is De-
nied its Right to Consent: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights
and Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4
(May 6, 2003), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/databases.html (last visited Feb. 6,
2005) (statement of Sen. Cornyn) [hereinafter Judicial Nominations Hearing].
26. See, e.g., Peter Jeremy Smith, Commas, Constitutional Grammar, and the
Straight-Face Test: What if Conan the Grammarian Were a Strict Textualist?, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 7, 29 (1999).
27. See United States Senate, U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 108th Congress-lst Ses-
sion: Vote Number 450 (Nov. 14, 2003), at http://www.senate.govflegislative/LIS/roll-call
lists/roll-call votecfm.cfm?congress=108&session=l&vote=00450 (last visited Jan. 22,
2005) (showing Jim Jeffords, Independent, voting against a motion to invoke cloture on a
U.S. Circuit judge nomination).
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cally different from Democrats for purposes of the constitutional-
ity of the filibuster. Moreover, Republicans have distinguished
their successful filibusters of President Clinton's nominations of
Sam Brown as Ambassador and Henry Foster as Surgeon Gen-
eral on the ground that these were not filibusters of judicial
nominations, which are unique because they involve the third
branch.2" It is, however, hard to see why this distinction makes a
difference for constitutional purposes. After all, the Constitution
provides that the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, may appoint "Officers of the United States," including
judges and certain other high-ranking officials.29 The Constitu-
tion does not set up, in other words, a separate or distinct ap-
pointment process for federal judges; they are subject, by virtue of
the uniform text, to the same constitutional procedures for ap-
pointments as every other officer of the United States.3" Pre-
sumably, this includes being subject as well to Article I's grant to
each chamber of the Congress the authority to devise its own
rules for its respective proceedings.31 There is nothing in either
Article I or the Appointments Clause directing that judges may
not be subject to the same procedural rules as other nominations
for appointment purposes.32
My third example comes from hearings before the Senate Judi-
ciary and Rules Committees at which I testified last summer. I
testified and presented a written statement on behalf of the con-
stitutionality of the filibuster,3 while Republican witnesses ar-
gued that it was unconstitutional.34 There are quite credible ar-
guments against the constitutionality of the filibuster,35 but the
28. See generally 149 CONG. REc. S3442 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (describing the Republicans' efforts to filibuster Executive Branch nominees).
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
30. See id.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
32. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
33. Judicial Nominations Hearing, supra note 25, at 26-28, 265-76 (testimony and
statement of Michael Gerhardt, Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, College of William &
Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law).
34. See, e.g., id. at 16-19 (testimony of Sen. Arlen Specter).
35. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REv. 181,
247 (1997) (arguing that entrenchment of the filibuster violates the principles that "[olne
legislature cannot bind subsequent legislatures" and examining the constitutionality of
the modem filibuster); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the
Federal Appointments Process, 50 DUKE L.J. 1687, 1708 (2001); John C. Roberts & Erwin
Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and
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Republican witnesses did not limit themselves to these. I had ar-
gued, among other things, that the filibuster was constitutional
for the same reasons as other procedures within the Senate allow-
ing small minorities, such as committee chairs, to sometimes
make what are final decisions on the fates of nominees.3 6 I
pointed out that the Chair of the Judiciary Committee, acting
alone, had prevented his committee as well as the Senate from
acting on more than sixty of President Clinton's judicial nomina-
tions.37 In response, Republican witnesses argued that these pro-
cedures, too, must be unconstitutional, with no Republican on the
Constitution Subcommittee coming to the defense of the Chair of
the Judiciary Committee, Senator Orrin Hatch.3" I was the only
witness who defended the constitutionality of all of Senator
Hatch's actions as Chair of the Judiciary Committee in the
1990s. 39
The second way in which confirmation contests resemble Talk
Radio is that senators (or their staffs) will demonize the opposi-
tion.4" Recall the famous advertisement that warned people about
"Robert Bork's America."4 Recall, as well, how ultimately suc-
cessful nominee Clarence Thomas turned the tables on his oppo-
sition by denouncing their responsibility for his hearings becom-
ing 'a high-tech lynching."'42 The Senate, by a vote strictly along
party lines, rejected the nomination to a district court of Missouri
Supreme Court Justice Ronnie White, whom some senators de-
Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773, 1780-81 (2003); Benjamin Lieber & Patrick Brown, Note,
On Supermajorities and the Constitution, 83 GEO. L.J. 2347, 2382 (1995). See generally
Judicial Nominations Hearing, supra note 25, at 1-63.
36. Judicial Nominations Hearing, supra note 25, at 266 (statement of Michael
Gerhardt, Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, College of William & Mary, Marshall-
Wythe School of Law).
37. See id. at 272-73.
38. See id. at 10-46 (testimony of various witnesses).
39. See id. at 272-73 (statement of Michael Gerhardt, Arthur B. Hanson Professor of
Law, College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law).
40. See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. S9188 (daily ed. July 1, 1987) (statement of Sen. Ken-
nedy) (stating that Robert Bork, who had been nominated to the Supreme Court, had an
"ominous" mindset).
41. See id.
42. Mark C. Niles, Clarence Thomas: The First Ten Years Looking for Consistency, 10
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 327, 335 (2002) (quoting Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Black
and White in America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 28, 1991, at 92); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, October Tragedy, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1497, 1511 (1992); Yxta Maya Murray,
The Cultural Implications of Judicial Selection, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 374, 393 (1994) (re-
viewing TONI MORRISON, RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA
HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (1992)).
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nounced as being soft on crime and opposed to the death penalty
(in spite of some evidence to the contrary).4 3 Racism is almost the
worst charge that can ever be made against a nominee.44 Perhaps
the worst thing to be called is a "liberal," while Democrats some-
times try to soften the support or even defeat a nomination by
suggesting the nominee is a "right-wing ideologue."45 Republicans
complain that Democrats are now responsible for the worst "cri-
sis" in the history of federal judicial selection,46 even though De-
mocrats have joined in approving, at a record pace, record num-
bers of the President's judicial nominees.4
A third way in which judicial selection resembles Talk Radio is
paranoia, or strong resistance to acknowledging that the other
side is capable of doing something good in the process. It is not
unusual for the contending sides in Senate debates to make refer-
ence to "us" and "them."48 "We" are the good guys, because we are
on the side of all that is good, while "they" are almost always the
bad guys responsible for whatever ails the Congress.49 In recent
debates over the filibuster, Republicans denounced Democrats for
being un-American in opposing the great principle of "majority
rule," ° while Democrats roundly complained that Republicans
were simply interested in facilitating "tyranny of the majority.""
Fourth, recent confirmation contests increasingly resembled
Talk Radio in the opposing sides' deployment of unthinking and
unfounded generalizations.52 One of the most common is to accuse
a targeted nominee of being an activist, even though the person
43. 150 CONG. REC. S5576-77 (daily ed. May 18, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
44. Cf. 150 CONG. REC. S172 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
45. 149 CONG. REC. S10,199 (daily ed. July 30, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
46. Sen. John Cornyn, Falsities on the Senate Floor, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Nov. 13,
2003, at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/cornyn2003lll3lO44.asp (last visited
Jan. 22, 2005); see also 149 CONG. REC. S14,528 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Frist) (describing the norms for federal judicial selection as having been "shattered").
47. 150 CONG. REC. S7744 (daily ed. July 7, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
48. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S14,528 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Frist); 149 CONG. REC. S10,199 (daily ed. July 30, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy);
Cornyn, supra note 46.
49. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S14,528 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Frist); 149 CONG. REC. S10,199 (daily ed. July 30, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
50. See 149 CONG. REC. 82644 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 2003) (statement of Sen. Domenici);
see also Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 35, at 185 ("[The filibuster's] net effect seems...
to undermine majority rule.").
51. 149 CONG. REC. S3678 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
52. See 150 CONG. REC. 88531 (daily ed. July 21, 2004) (statement of Sen. Stabenow).
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may never have been a judge or might have disavowed any incli-
nation towards activist decision-making on the bench.53 Neverthe-
less, each side accuses the other of trying to appoint "activists" to
the bench.54 An activist is someone who would legislate from the
bench, presumably striking down the policies he dislikes and ap-
proving those he likes.55
This rhetoric is disturbing for at least two reasons. The first is
what it is likely to lead neutral, uninformed, or non-partisan ob-
servers to think about our political process. It is likely that they
will wonder whether both sides are correct. If so, the rhetoric
merely confirms what social scientists have argued for years-
namely, that judges are merely policymakers who wear robes.56
They argue that judges do one of two things when they decide
cases-they either vote their policy preferences directly or ma-
nipulate the law in order to facilitate their personal or policy ob-
jectives.57 Without a doubt, both sides in confirmation contests
appear to be trying to do the same thing-control judicial out-
comes. Imagine what law students must wonder when they wit-
ness these events, for each side argues that the other is interested
in appointing people who will merely vote to uphold their side's
policies as constitutional, but not the policies of the other side.55
Law professors expend a lot of energy contesting the characteri-
zations and findings of social scientists,59 but it is hard for them
to dispel the impression left by debate after debate that what is
up for grabs in these cases are the outcomes of judicial disputes."0
Neither side in the debate concedes that the other's criteria for
judicial selection are legitimate.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., id. at S8528 (statement of Sen. Sessions).
55. See id. at S8527 (statement of Sen. Sessions).
56. See, e.g., Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Ju-
dicial Elections, the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
301, 304 (2003); Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policy-
maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 583-84 (2001). See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); Michael J.
Gerhardt, Judicial Decisionmaking: Attitudes About Attitudes, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1733
(2003) (reviewing SEGAL & SPAETH, supra).
57. See Dimino, supra note 56, at 304; see also Epstein, supra note 56, at 584-85 (ar-
guing that justices "effectuate their own policy and institutional goals" by also taking into
account the "goals and likely actions of the members of the other branches").
58. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S8588 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
59. See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 56, at 1733.
60. See id. at 1741.
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Indeed, confirmation contests reflect all too clearly the absence
of consensus on what qualifies someone as a good judge or Jus-
tice. When one side derides the other for favoring activists, it is
charging them with appointing people who will put their views
ahead of, or in place of, the law.6' The ensuing disagreements are
likely to be discouraging to young people who might be inclined to
think each side is interested in merit. While President George W.
Bush defends each of his nominees on the grounds of merit,62 it is
hard to take him at his word. He has been careful not to define
precisely what he means by "merit." He has left it to senators
(and others) to infer his nominating criteria. Hence, Democrats
plausibly infer two things from his judicial nominations-they
have been largely picked on the bases of ideology and youth.6
President Bush's nominees all seem to share a common ideol-
ogy-none is pro-choice or gay or in favor of affirmative action in
any form.' At least one nominee-Charles Pickering, Sr.-is one
of the most often reversed district judges in his circuit.65 Some
have strong records in public service or in law school, but most
are less than fifty-five years old.66 President Bush is rapidly ap-
proaching the point of having appointed the youngest appellate
court judges in history.6"
61. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S8588 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
62. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President During Federal Judicial
Appointees Announcement, (May 9, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/05/20010509-3.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).
63. DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 5, at 1113-15; ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL
SELECTION IN THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION: ALLIANCE
FOR JUSTICE JUDICIAL SELECTION PROJECT, 2001-02 BIENNIAL REPORT 2, 23 (2003), at
http://www.allianceforjustice.orglimages/collection_images/2001-02_AFJBiennialRe
port.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2005). See generally Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirma-
tion Wars: Ideology and the Battle for the Federal Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871 (2005).
64. See What's at Stake-Bush's Nominations to the U.S. Court of Appeals, at
http://www.adaction.org/bushcourt2003.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2005). See generally
Perry Bacon, Jr., What About the Supremes?, TIME ONLINE, Sept. 7, 2004, at
http://www.time.com/time/election2004/article/0,18471,693850,00.html (last visited Jan.
19, 2005); Stephen B. Presser, Remarks at the Senate Committee Hearings on the Judicial
Nomination Process (June 26, 2001), reprinted in 50 DRAKE L. REV. 429, 453-61 (2002).
65. See, e.g., People for the American Way, Opposing the Confirmation of Charles W.
Pickering, Sr. to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; Judge Pickering's
Troubling Record of Reversals in the Court, at http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.
aspx?oid=1207# (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).
66. DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 5, at 1115.
67. See id.
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II.
There are several possible causes for the increasing resem-
blance between judicial selection and Talk Radio. One may be the
twenty-four-hour news cycle on cable. The proliferation of media
outlets has arguably made it harder for someone to get on televi-
sion, cable, or in news print if he or she makes relatively bland,
deliberate statements. Instead, visibility depends a great deal on
drama. The more dramatic someone is, the more likely he or she
can make the news. A number of studies show that the media is
reporting less hard news-facts and figures-and more soft
news-speculation and commentary.6"
A second possible cause is the need for both candidates and in-
terest groups to raise money. Campaign finance reform has not
eliminated the need and thus the incentive for senators or inter-
est groups to condemn the other side as extremist. This kind of
characterization helps them solicit money, particularly from their
base.
Yet another possible cause in the increasing resemblance be-
tween Talk Radio and confirmation contests is the disappearing
middle in the Senate.69 The Senate no longer resembles how it
looked in the 1980s.7" Today, there are fewer people who charac-
terize themselves as moderates in either party, and voting along
party-lines has been increasing.71 The disappearing moderate
middle in the Senate makes it harder to find common ground.
A fourth possible cause is the high stakes involved in judicial
selection. As I have indicated, each side is painfully aware that
we are in the midst of the second longest period in our history
without a vacancy arising on the Supreme Court.72 Moreover,
each side is aware of the fact that it has become a norm for circuit
court judges to be the pool from which to select Supreme Court
nominees.73 The last nominees to the Court to come straight from
68. See Global Blinders; The End of the Cold War Hastened a Retreat from Foreign
News-Until September 11, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov./Dec. 2001, at 110 (discussing
the "intensified soft-news phenomenon").
69. See Sarah A. Binder, The Disappearing Political Center: Congress and the Incredi-
ble Shrinking Middle, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1996, at 36, 38-39.
70. Id. at 36, 39.
71. Id. at 39.
72. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
73. Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for
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private or governmental practice were Lewis Powell and William
Rehnquist in 197 1. 7 Hence, each side has come to believe that it
might be easier to defeat a potential nominee to the Court the
first time he is nominated rather than wait for the higher-profile
moment when he might be nominated to the Court from a circuit
court judgeship (for which the Senate has confirmed him).75
Moreover, each side recognizes that the federal circuit courts
have the final say over the vast majority of cases they decide.76
III.
The remaining question is whether reform of the judicial selec-
tion process is possible. Reform of the process has been rare, but
it is not, as some might be disposed to say, unprecedented.7 7 To
begin with, education of the public is essential. It is important for
people to understand the genuine stakes in judicial selection and
particularly how to stem the collapse of the process into Talk Ra-
dio. For instance, few people, outside of the nation's Capitol, are
probably aware that the Senate has approved the vast majority of
the President's judicial nominations. 7' His record of success is, in
fact, the best ever.79
Moreover, it is a mistake to think that conflict is inevitable
within the process. Conflict is a choice rather than an inevitabil-
ity. For example, Democrats reached an agreement with the
President earlier this summer to allow twenty-five "non-
controversial" judicial nominations to be fully processed within
the Senate in exchange for his agreeing not to make any recess
Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903, 907 (2003).
74. Id. at 906.
75. See generally id.
76. See Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and the Canon of Accept-
able Arguments, 47 EMORY L.J. 89, 104 (1998).
77. See, e.g., SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: ,LOWER COURT
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 236-50 (1997) (describing President
Jimmy Carter's reform ofjudicial selection).
78. See generally 150 CONG. REC. S7744 (daily ed. July 7, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (stating that President George W. Bush's nominees are being confirmed at a rate
higher than any recent president); see also Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars:
Ideology and the Battle for the Federal Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871, 904-08 app.,
tbls.1-5 (2005).
79. See generally 150 CONG. REC. S7744 (daily ed. July 7, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
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appointments of federal judges."0 Once these nominations go
through, the federal judiciary, in Professor Carl Tobias's judg-
ment, "will be closer to full strength than at any time in the last
13 years."8 ' Of course, this is no accident, given that the time pe-
riod to which Professor Tobias refers was the final year of Presi-
dent George H.W. Bush's administration. 2
Last but not least, one other thing needed in the process is
greater, rather than lesser, deliberation. The President has ex-
cluded the American Bar Association from the selection process in
order to expedite the confirmation of his nominees.8 3 He has been
largely successful in achieving his objective, but at a price.8 4 For
one thing, he has cut out the likeliest body that could keep the
players honest.8" Moreover, speed is not necessarily a virtue in
the selection process, and the American people are sometimes
disserved when the President's party rubber stamps his nomi-
nees. For instance, President Bush insisted that the Senate
quickly confirm his nominee, Jay Bybee, for a seat on the prestig-
ious United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.8 6 Some
senators wanted to delay the nomination in order to find out more
about what Bybee had done as the head of the prestigious Office
of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department. 7 The Justice De-
partment refused to release memos he had written or authorized
addressing the President's obligations to comply with federal or
international law on torture.88 Without this information, Republi-
80. See, e.g., Helen Dewar, President, Senate Reach Pact on Judicial Nominations;
Bush Vows He Won't Use Recess Appointments; 25 to Get Vote, WASH. POST, May 19, 2004,
at A21.
81. Carl W. Tobias, Deal Creates Respite, NAT'L L.J., June 7, 2004, at 23.
82. See id.
83. See Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to President George W. Bush, to Mar-
tha W. Barnett, President, American Bar Association (Mar. 22, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010322-5.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2005) (declaring the termination of ABA approval); see also Laura E. Little, The ABA's
Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial Candidates: Are We Ready to Give up on the Law-
yers?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 37, 37-38 (2001); Terry Carter, Squeeze Play: Bush Acts
to Limit ABA Role in Screening Judicial Nominations, A.B.A. J., May 2001, at 18; Jona-
thon Groner, ABA Adjusts to Role on Judges, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 5, 2002, at 10.
84. See 150 CONG. REc. 88589 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
85. See Little, supra note 83, at 51-53.
86. See generally 149 CONG. REC. S3679-80 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Ensign) (declaring the nomination of Jay S. Bybee, of Nevada, to be a judge on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
87. See 150 CONG. REC. S7547 (daily ed. July 6, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
88. See id.
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cans pushed the nomination through the Senate.8 9 The problem is
that, a few months later, the administration released the memo-
randa sought by the Democrats.9" Moreover, it did so only after
the White House Counsel, in an extraordinary move, publicly re-
jected the memoranda as too "abstract" or too "academic."91 There
is no doubt whatsoever that Democrats never would have allowed
the Bybee nomination to reach the Senate floor had they received
the documents they had requested.92 It is possible that some Re-
publicans might have been troubled, too.
President Bush, Senator John Kerry, and other senators have
not yet avoided their political accountability for what they have
done or not done on judicial nominations, the Iraq War, and other
matters. The political accountability of our leaders serves as a
principal check on what people do in the judicial selection proc-
ess. Presidents and senators often act the way they do in this
process because, to paraphrase President Clinton, they can.93 If
you want greater consensus within this process, then you might
want to vote for a president capable of statesmanship-someone
who really is, to coin a phrase, a uniter, rather than a divider.
Whether judicial selection continues to be like Talk Radio or
whether we can restore more dignity to it depends, in the end, on
our remembering what the sign that sat on President Harry
Truman's desk said-the buck stops here.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Toni Locy & Joan Biskupic, Interrogation Memo to Be Replaced; Justice Dept. Offi-
cial Calls Legal Advice Overly Broad, USA TODAY, June 23, 2004, at 2A.
92. See 150 CONG. REC. S7547 (daily ed. July 6, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
93. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, Bill Clinton's Very Personal Reflections: In '60 Minutes'
Interview, Ex-President Calls Affair 'Terrible Moral Error', WASH. POST, June 17, 2004, at
C1 (stating that when Bill Clinton was asked why he had an extramarital affair with
Monica Lewinsky, he responded by saying "because I could"); Abigail Trafford, Bill and
Dan's Midlife Adventure, WASH. POST, July 6, 2004, at Fl.
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